

CUSF - “Core Untouched Soft Fork”
or: “Soft Forks, without a Soft Fork”,
or “The Ordinal-ization of Soft Forks”


Paul Sztorc
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Summary

Softforks should be a separate, standalone piece of software, “piloting” Bitcoin Core via the “invalidateblock” rpc. This makes soft forks *faster, safer, and easier to understand*, -- ushering in a new age of Bitcoin Development.

The Idea

The current soft fork process is so vague that arguably *no one knows what it is* -- but it certainly involves opening a github pull request. Here, I present an alternative process: put new softfork validation rules in their own, separate piece(s) of software. This software can use “getblock” and “invalidateblock” (via rpc access to Bitcoin Core) to enforce new consensus rules. This has many advantages.



This *tiny* change, has enormous implications:

	<u>Before CUSF</u>	<u>After CUSF</u>
How is it perceived by the layperson?	<p>Soft forks are <u>surgery</u> on our beloved only child.</p> <p>One software (Bitcoin Core) that is “changed” in a permanent, and poorly-understood way.</p>	<p>Soft forks are just other apps that users run – similar to ordinals.</p> <p>We can turn them on or off, the same way we turn anything else on or off. They are modular and safe.</p>
How are soft forks activated?	<p>Follow these steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Think of the idea. 2. Discuss on bitcoin-dev (mailing list). 3. Write code for testnet/regtest version. 4. Test on Inquisition / similar. 5. ??? Get feedback from users / Twitter 6. Spend 20+ hours rebasing your soft fork to the latest version of Bitcoin Core. 7. Open pull request. 8. Reply to PR-Feedback on GitHub. 9. Repeat steps 5-8, every 3 months for 2 years. 10. Pull request is merged. (?) (Or not.) 11. Activation logic is merged. 12. Debates about activation, Bip9/8, Speedy Trial, LoT=true, Hashrate Thresholds, UASF -- virtue signaling on Twitter -- 13. Speedy Trial (or whatever), is yolo'ed by someone. 14. Months later, 90% hashrate finally upgrades -- even though they don't really understand what the soft fork is or what it does. 15. People start using the feature. 	<p>Follow these steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Think of an idea. 2. Write the code. 3. Write a document, explaining how your idea boosts miner profits. (Either via a higher BTC price, or via more txn fees.) 4. Miners (ie Pools) run your software, alongside their existing software. (They can stop running it at any time.) 5. Users also run your software, and start using the feature.
How do you deactivate the fork?	<p>This is so difficult, that it has never happened. It involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * A hard fork (ie, a disaster), OR * A new soft fork, that censors the 1st SF at the txn level (ie, bikeshedding & authority). 	<p>Very easy – people stop running the Activator software. The soft fork just naturally de-activates.</p>

Speed of Innovation?	Softforks are always SLOW and academic. “Like replacing an aircraft engine while the plane is in the air”.	Soft forks can be FAST and experimental – they can be like startups.
How is a soft fork justified to the layperson?	We need <u>to explain to people</u> why the soft fork is safe.	It is <u>obvious</u> that SFs are safe. No existing users can even <u>detect</u> a CUSF. Forks are pushed are pushed to the mining side where they belong.
Who must agree to run the fork?	Users of the New Feature, + + 51% Hashrate, + All BCMs, + All who rely on Bitcoin Core	Users of the New Feature, + + 51% Hashrate
What is the Guiding Principle of the Yes/No Activation Decision?	Does this softfork “have consensus”? (This is an unfalsifiable theory in practice – it also defeats the original purpose of the hard/soft fork distinction. At best, it is very hard to measure – at worst it is an unfalsifiable theory.) Will the code be easy to merge/maintain/run ?	Will running this software <u>increase miner profits?</u>
Who can be negatively affected by a fork? (In a way other than a reorg.)	BCMs: they must... ...evaluate the SF-code. ...maintain the SF-code in perpetuity (if merged). ...release an emergency fix if something goes wrong.	Only those who <u>choose</u> to opt-in to the new feature. (Including 51% hashrate.)
What are today’s Developer Incentives?	Bad – we must trust today’s BCMs. (Trust them to only make the “right” changes.) Low oversight (or even understanding). BCMs are hard to fire or replace. Each change makes the software code harder for a newbie to learn.	Good – anyone can become a Bitcoin developer at any time. Or leave. Devs compete <u>against</u> each other – (competition keeps developers honest). Developers are accountable to <u>a neutral external metric</u> (mining profits), not a corrupt USSR-style bureaucracy “popularity contest”.
Effect on “job security” of BCMs?	Enormous “job security” for BCMs.	Job security decreases. Soft fork innovators can do whatever they like, without needing permission from BCMs. BCM role fades into irrelevance as they become more replaceable “maintenance” workers.
What form can the new code take?	The SF must be in C++. It must be a github/Bitcoin pull request. It must obey the style guides & naming conventions & code architecture of github/Bitcoin.	The SF can take any form. It can be written in any programming language. It can use any style/naming convention.
How might we port the soft fork to an Altcoin?	The SF would have to be rewritten. A new set of _CMs will be inconvenienced.	Can be freely reused by <u>any</u> L1. (So, Litecoin, Monero, whatever, they can have their own BIP 119/118, without changing their own code.)

How important is code review?	Review is essential.	Review is unnecessary.
Can anyone obstruct the process, and get away with it (without accountability)?	Core devs have a veto (incl. silent veto & pocket veto) , can demand changes in style, formate, language, readability – these can be time-wasting filibuster changes.	Core devs do not necessarily need to be consulted. (Of course, miners might <i>voluntarily consult</i> 3 rd party expert advisors, and <i>choose</i> to follow their advice.)
Toxic Incentievs	The high 90% Activation Threshold results in “toxic limbo”: where 2 (or more) 11%-hashrate-coalitions can emerge, and make mutually inconsistent demands – resulting in minority gridlock. This gridlock is an Achille’s Heel of Bitcoin that can be exploited by other enemies.	Simple, logical, internally consistent 50% hashrate threshold, with no 3 rd parties having a veto.
Does anyone <u>suffer</u> by acting too slowly?	No – and this invites laziness! We move along at a slow, academic, bureaucratic pace. No one feels nervous about being “left behind”.	Yes – and this is a good thing! If 49%-hashrate are too-slow to join the 51%-hashrate, then they are at risk. Their blocks may be invalidated by pranksters, causing loss of ALL their revenues (whilst paying 100% costs). This means that miners are obligated to stay “at the cutting edge” of soft forks, just as they are obligated to stay at the cutting edge re: electricity, asics, cooling, etc.

FAQ

Q: Why is this idea important?

A: Because today’s Bitcoiners misunderstand the soft fork. To the potential ruin of us all.

Q: Why do you want to change Bitcoin???

A: Soft forks are simultaneously a change, and not-a-change. Like how a car can go both forward and in reverse. Anyone who believes “soft fork” = change, has missed the whole point of the soft fork.

Q: Some people [such as Luke Dashjr] told me that soft forks are mandatory, and that it isn’t “Bitcoin” unless I run the latest version.

A: They are wrong. In a different universe, Wladimir clicks a button to release the next “Bitcoin” release on github, and immediately a sphere of light expands, from his index finger, outward in all directions, traveling through all matter, through even the core of the planet. It destroys old versions of Bitcoin on

contact (or magically uninstalls them, whatever). We don't live in that universe. But in that one, Luke is correct.

Q: Bitcoin is just fine as it is! Our success is inevitable.

A: Defeating the USD is hard enough – but that is only the tip of the iceberg. Bitcoin must also defeat every rival version of itself, since these will all be released as Altcoins sooner or later. We must be proactive about every deficiency, and every use-case. We must grow as quickly and rapidly as possible, or we will be replaced by something else that does. We have been lucky so far, but this luck will not last. The “we are fine” crowd, are paving the road to \$0 per BTC. This idea is about defeating those people.

Q: What's so great about these new soft forks?

A: Bitcoin is underperforming. The UX should not have addresses anymore –the privacy should be complete – we should be able to scale to 8 billion users without LN – miners should be making billions of dollars a year in txn revenue. If the softfork bottleneck is solved, we will achieve all of this and more. Otherwise, it will be “Custodial LN” and other anti-P2P services such as Liquid or Fedimint.

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Some Background on the Soft Fork

The **soft fork** is underappreciated in Bitcoin, to a degree that boggles the mind. Never in the history of technology, has something so useful and safe been so completely misunderstood. The soft fork can do almost anything, for free and at the lowest risk. It gives Bitcoiners an ossified protocol that is also extensible – the best of both worlds.

Soft forks are so safe, they are actually safer than routine code-maintenance. For example: code refactoring, CVE-fixes, dependencies / OS -compatibility – these are all riskier than a soft fork. The soft fork is so magical, that it reduces overall code risks, just by being used (for example, it utterly discredits its evil brother – the hard fork) and fosters a climate of modularity and liberalism. Soft forks are also optional, and even reversible (though the latter has not yet been tried).

For example, Bip300 (my own soft fork) would grant the protocol the following: planetary scale throughput, zCash level privacy, and limitless extensibility. It is so good of an idea, that it is likely to bankrupt all the rival cryptocurrencies, the rival BTC L2s, and perhaps even many exchanges, podcasts, and other middlemen. Other soft forks are equally powerful in their own way, such as OP Vault or OP cat.

All that is true. Yet the common Bitcoiner of 2024, has a strange reluctance to embrace the soft fork. We now hear this curious phrase: “can be done on Bitcoin without a soft fork”, as if this were a good thing. (Hardly!) Some prominent voices –who should know better— mistakenly describe softforks as “a change to Bitcoin”, and stir up false prejudice against them, insinuating that they may “screw up the base layer”. (As if a library's card catalog could be ruined, if never-before-seen books were placed into an empty closet. Meanwhile, the Refactor Gang comes into the library every Tuesday, copies over the card catalogue by hand, onto blank cards, and throws out the old cards, ad hoc -- with no complaints from the Ossify Gang. Truly the lunatics have taken over the asylum.)

Despite their nearly-divine perfection, soft forks do have one victim in earnest: the Bitcoin Core Maintainers (BCMs). BCMs do the thankless (and de facto unpaid) job of maintaining Bitcoin Core on Github. They build each new release. They have their own “way of doing things”. They have a culture, norms, etc. They are held responsible if the code breaks. (Thus, they err on the paranoid side; and

certainly on the *uncontroversial* side.) For you or I, to go to github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin and move the code around – that would be as rude, as if they walked into our house and started moving around our furniture. They also have a *prestige economy* with Tribal Rules about who is allowed to touch the Sacred Code -- and when, and why. This is partly political (and thus, partly corrupt and evil), but also partly rational. For example, consider the case of CVEs – there must be specialist devs *who are warned first* of severe bugs, so as to patch them secretly *before* the public learns of them.

Soft forks have a 2nd weakness: their history. The Blocksize War led to the politicization of –first– the Blocksize increase, and –second– the “SegWit” soft fork. SegWit activation was plagued by obstructionist Largeblockers. This “descended into politics”, and ruined the technical dialogue for (probably) an entire generation. In particular, the word “consensus” took on a new meaning (“all humans agreeing” – something which never happens). Today, soft forks are treated to a dysfunctional, USSR-style committee discussion. BIPs 118/119, for example, are “finished” – they are helpful, harmless, coded, and tested. But BCMs refuse to even *discuss* activation. Thus 118 has languished, un-activated and unused. For 119, this pattern repeated, with the variation that Jeremy Rubin released an activation client (and also an anti-activation client), and was then immediately criticized by “the community” to the point that he quit -- not only quitting 119 but also quitting Bitcoin Development and Bitcoin itself. Years later, his critics would be the very same people cheering for “ARK” and “CTV” -- the very same idea they hated years before. It is the *soft fork process* that is broken – not 119. So it is with Bip300, and LNHNance, and OP CAT, and every other soft fork. It is time to bring them all back.

Appendix 1. Can corrupt CoreDevs block CUSE, in any way?

(This question asked for Theoretical / Political Wargaming purposes only.)

No.

First -- they may try to remove the “invalidateblock” rpc. (After all, it is already a [“hidden rpc” not shown under the help menu](#) .).

But probably, they would not dare to try even this. First of all, “invalidateblock” is very useful, especially during *times of crisis*. Second, *today’s software* has “invalidateblock” –devs can only remove it from future versions. But miners/users may never run those. (Ironically, this would be akin to a hard fork.)

But second -- enforcer does not literally require invalidateblock. Instead, it could just *repeatedly delete* the offending block, off of the user’s computer. And then restart the node (or call [-rescan](#)). The enforcer’s delete operation will be faster than the re-download – the enforcer will be able to [parse/delete/force-rescan] a 2 MB block in about 2/10th of a second. But to connect/download/rescan/validate a 2 MB block, [takes +100x as long](#) .

The Enforcer has rpc access, and can therefore do all sorts of things. It can *peers.dat* or *banlist.dat*, it can parse blocks and corrupt them in some fine-tuned way (after which Core will see them as invalid). In a theoretically extreme case, the Enforcer can conjure up a 2nd instance of BitcoinD -- in regtest mode, where the enforcer is the only peer. Thus it would only ever see blocks that are soft-fork-valid.

Appendix 2: A Brief Timeline of Bitcoin Liberalism

Different people use the blockchain in different ways. This is a timeline of various attempts – successful and unsuccessful – to resolve the issue of disagreement.

Year	Invention	Enabled...	...But:
2010	BitDNS (aka "Namecoin")	...a new blockchain, with a new feature (human-readable name ownership).	Rival PoW system, + rival coin-unit.
2010	Merged Mining	...mine many blockchains at once, for free, "increasing total strength".	Still a rivalrous coin unit.
2012	"Soft" Change ("Soft Fork")	...deploy new features to the whole network, without needing everyone to upgrade their software. (51% hashrate must upgrade, only.)	Only works for some features.
2014-2017	Sidechain Research	...discuss "sidechains" in the public consciousness. Bitcoiners can utilize *any* existing feature.	No software – research only.
2017	Major Hard Fork	A new feature (8 MB blocks) is deployed (via BCH). BTC-UTXO-owners automatically own BCH, so they are not impoverished if the new feature succeeds.	Competitive struggle over network effects, and the "Bitcoin" name. Enormous advantage to the status-quo coin.
2021	zCash Regtest Demo	Software demo of a P2P sidechain – cloning the Altcoin zCash.	Regtest/testnet -- not real BTC.
2023	Bip300 Pull Request	"Real BTC" sidechains.	Corrupt/dysfunctional Bitcoin Core monopoly is run via prestige economy, does not prioritize what is best for the network.
2024	CUSF	Activate via a 2 nd daemon -- without modifying the 1 st daemon (ie Bitcoin Core). Allows BIP-Authors & Bitcoin Core to ignore each other.	Requires 51% hashrate. Miner collective action problem – early upgraders take most risk, and later miners free-ride off them.
2024	SHAD	Miners upgrade independently of what other miners do. (In fact, miners now prefer their rivals be slow to upgrade.)	Somewhat disruptive for a few months.